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Abstract
The current ACL proposals show some shortcomings with respect to the deﬁnition
of their semantics. Our paper aims at tackling those issues by deﬁning an ACL
semantics as a speciﬁcation of the analytical eﬀects of agent communicative acts. We
analyze agent communication in terms of concepts taken from Speech Act Theory, as
several researchers have already done, but move away from the mainstream view of
artiﬁcial agent research, as we deﬁne communicative acts in terms of changes at the
level of social relationship between agents. We take commitment to be a primitive
concept underlying the social dimension of multiagent systems, and deﬁne a basic
artiﬁcial institution whose aim is to provide agents with the means to aﬀect the
commitment network that binds them to each other.
1 Introduction
Our work aims at deﬁning a sound and eﬀective framework for communica-
tion between agents in open multiagent systems. To date, all major proposals
have shared the assumption that agent communication is to be dealt with in
terms of speech acts, a notion that comes from philosophy of language. We
think that this approach is so widespread mainly because AI research often
deals with planning and rational action, and considering communication as a
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form of action makes it natural to embed a communicative component in an
agent’s architecture. Our work has been developed from this standpoint, but
we intend to tackle some issues that have not been dealt with in a satisfactory
way, possibly hindering the rise of a universally accepted ACL standard. In a
previous work [2], we have highlighted some shortcomings in the deﬁnition of
communicative acts in FIPA ACL. We give FIPA the credit for separating the
utterance level of a communicative act (the process of sending a message) from
the level of illocution (the mental states characterizing the sender). Neverthe-
less, FIPA’s deﬁnition refers to agents’ mental states, and thus fails to grasp
the institutional nature of illocution, which is where our work kicks oﬀ from.
Instead of dealing with mental states, we analytically deﬁne communicative
acts in terms of changes at the level of social relationship between agents. We
take commitment to be a primitive concept that underlies the social structure
of a multiagent system, and describe communicative acts as actions brought
about by an agent to aﬀect the network of commitments that bind the agent
to the others. Agents communicate by performing message exchanges, which
count as communicative acts only if some particular conditions hold. These
conditions include the authorizations the agents must be granted to be able to
perform such acts. We then need to deﬁne artificial institutions that not only
are responsible for issuing and managing such authorizations, but also aﬀect
communication by determining the social relationship between the communi-
cating agents. For instance, for an order issued to agent y by agent x to be
felicitous, the two agents must be part of a hierarchical organization, empow-
ering x to give y orders: such a hierarchy provides for a suitable institutional
ground for the execution of orders. By the term institution we mean a set
of shared rules that regulate the management of a fragment of social reality
([9],[6]). From our perspective, we assume that to play a part in multiagent
systems, an agent must be oﬃcially recognized as a member of the “society
of agents”. To achieve this, the agent has to undergo a suitable registration
procedure, which enables it to interact with other registered agents according
to the Basic Institution, that is, the institution that sets the general rules of
agent interaction.
In Section 2 we give a brief description of the formalism we use to describe
the communicative acts that agents bring about. Agents are enabled to do so
as they are members of the Basic Institution, whose structure is described in
Sections 3 to 6. Section 3 is dedicated to the core ontology, which describes
commitments, the actions by which agents can manipulate them, the ontolog-
ical presuppositions of these actions, and the truth conditions of the sentences
that form the commitments’ content and determine their state. Section 4 deals
with the authorizations that agents are granted by the Basic Institution, and
Section 5 brieﬂy tackles the issues related to the norms established by an
institution. Section 6 illustrates the message exchanges that agents have to
perform to aﬀect the social network of commitments. Section 7 gives a com-
plete view on how all the components of the Basic Institution aﬀect agent
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communication by representing the performance of basic communicative acts
in a general form. Section 8 takes into account those communicative acts, like
orders and declarations, that need further special institutions to be carried
out successfully; we also illustrate how to execute all communicative acts in
the form of a declaration. Finally, in Section 9 we draw our conclusions.
2 Communicative acts
An agent must be registered in order to interact with other registered agents
within the context of the Basic Institution. We assume that all registered
agents play a speciﬁc role (RegAgt) within the Basic Institution (BI ). If a is
a registered agent, the formula
Role(a,BI,RegAgt)
holds. Agents are able to bring about events of diﬀerent types. We reify
events, that is, we treat them as individuals belonging to speciﬁc event types.
In the human world, events that are intentionally brought about by one or
more actors are called actions. In the world of artiﬁcial agents, distinguishing
between what is intentional and what is not is problematic. If we regarded
agents as intentional systems, that is, as systems entertaining mental states
like beliefs, desires, and intentions (see for example [12]), it would be plausible
to distinguish between events and intentional actions, but we would also bring
in a number of philosophical and practical problems that are far from being
solved. We therefore prefer to adopt a more cautious approach, not consider-
ing artiﬁcial agents as intentional systems. We shall simply assume that the
responsibility for certain events can be ascribed to speciﬁc agents. An event
whose responsibility can be ascribed to a speciﬁc agent can be denoted with
the term ‘action’. When agent a brings about an event (or performs an action)
e of type τ , the formula
Done(e,a,τ)
holds. For the sake of simplicity, we may use the ‘n-dash’ character to express
existential quantiﬁcation, as in the examples below:
Done(e,-,τ) ∃xDone(e,x,τ);
Done(e,-,-) ∃x∃τDone(e,x,τ).
To illustrate the axioms dealing with events, we enrich our Semantic Lan-
guage (SL) with CTL*-like operators [3], relying on an intuitive understanding
of these operators. We assume that the logical model relies on a discrete-time
frame with a tree-like structure, inﬁnite both in the future and in the past,
in which every state has a unique predecessor and at least one successor, and
there is at most one walk between any pair of states. In such a frame, a path
is a sequence of states, each of which is the predecessor of the following one.
A path is inﬁnite only in the future, as it has a starting state without a pre-
decessor. We assume that on every path an event can happen only once, as
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stated by the following axiom:
(UE) Done(e,-,-)→ G−X−¬Done(e,-,-)∧AG+X+¬Done(e,-,-).
Here we use temporal operators, whose intuitive meanings are as follows:
A for all paths;
G+ always on the current path, at the current state and in the future;
G− always on the current path, at the current state and in the past;
X+ at the next state on the current path;
X− at the previous state on the current path.
A formal account of the temporal logic in which we embed our communication
framework can be found in [11].
We now consider communicative acts, that is, actions that agents bring
about to communicate with other agents. We regard them as institutional
acts performed by way of exchanging messages. In particular, we focus our
attention on those events that agents are authorized to perform by the Basic
Institution.
We deﬁne the semantics of our communication framework as a speciﬁca-
tion of the analytical eﬀects of events of message exchange. Past proposals
like FIPA’s relate these eﬀects to the agents’ mental states, and thus, in our
opinion, raise some problems.
To deﬁne communicative acts independently of the message level without
relying on mental states, we adopt an approach dealing with commitments,
already followed in other scientiﬁc papers like [10], [1], and [13]. As com-
mitments are part of the social reality deﬁned and regulated by the Basic
Institution, we give a more detailed description of this institution to illustrate
how it enables agents to perform communicative acts.
Some work in the direction of deﬁning institutions in general has already
been carried out in the ﬁeld of multiagent systems (see for example [4]). For
our purposes, we deﬁne an institution as comprised of four fundamental com-
ponents:
core ontology the ontology of the fragment of reality the institution is in-
tended to regulate;
authorizations the speciﬁcation of the institutional eﬀects that each member
of the institution is empowered to bring about;
norms the obligations and the permissions imposed by the institution to its
members;
conventions the speciﬁcation of the concrete events that conventionally bring
about institutional eﬀects.
The Basic Institution regulates the general aspects of all kinds of agent inter-
action, including commitments, as we explain in the sequel.
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3 Core ontology of the Basic Institution
An institution is intended to regulate a fragment of social reality; its core
ontology deﬁnes the set of entities such fragment is comprised of.
3.1 Commitment
In our approach, the core ontology of the Basic Institution deﬁnes the con-
cepts of commitment, precommitment, and a set of operations for commitment
manipulation. Commitment is a primitive concept underlying the relations be-
tween agents that play the role of RegAgt within the Basic Institution. More
precisely, a commitment holds in a state in which an agent (the debtor) is
bound, relative to another agent (the creditor), to the fact that some propo-
sition (the content) is true. The content of a commitment is a sentence of a
Content Language (CL) represented as a ﬁrst-order term of SL. The relevant
formula is
Comm(e,x,y,s),
which states that a communicative act e has brought about a situation that
binds agent x, with respect to agent y, to the truth of a proposition of the
content language, represented by the SL term s. When there is a commitment
proposal to an agent (normally, the potential debtor), but it has not been ac-
cepted nor refused yet, we say that a precommitment holds. Precommitments
are represented in the same way as commitments:
Prec(e,x,y,s)
holds when e has brought about a precommitment between two agents (the
potential debtor x and the potential creditor y) to the truth of a CL sen-
tence represented by s. We think that the creation (and the modiﬁcation) of
(pre)commitments are those eﬀects of communicative events that have to be
dealt with to deﬁne an eﬀective ACL semantics.
Deﬁning the truth conditions for sentences in our model is not trivial,
mainly because of the branching structure of time. This issue and the relation
between SL and CL are explored in more detail in Section 3.4.
3.2 Commitment manipulation
In our treatment, both commitments and precommitments arise from the per-
formance of communicative acts. More precisely, agents bring about com-
municative events by exchanging messages; a communicative event, under
given conditions, counts as a commitment manipulation action, which creates
a new (pre)commitment or modiﬁes the state of an existing one, thus aﬀecting
the relations between agents and, if we view commitment as a deontic state,
their obligations towards each other. The core ontology of the Basic Insti-
tution allows for ﬁve basic operations for commitment manipulation. Com-
mitments can be made or cancelled, and precommitments can be made, can-
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celled, or accepted, that is, turned into actual commitments. Registered agents
achieve these results by performing actions of the following types: make com-
mitment (mc(x,y,s)), make precommitment (mp(x,y,s)), cancel commitment
(cc(e,x,y,s)), cancel precommitment (cp(e,x,y,s)), and accept precommitment
(ap(e,x,y,s)). Such action types are deﬁned by axioms that describe their con-
stitutive eﬀects, that is, the state of aﬀairs that necessarily hold after a token
of the given action type is performed.
We need to introduce some more temporal operators to express axioms in
a simpler form:
φU+ψ (φ is true until ψ is eventually true);
φW+ψ  G+φ ∨ φU+ψ (weak until operator);
φZ+ψ  φW+ψ∧G+(ψ →G+¬φ) (φZ+ψ is true if and only if in the future
ψ never becomes true and φ is always true, or φ is true until ψ eventually
becomes true and since then φ is no longer true).
We are now ready to illustrate the axioms that describe the commitment
manipulation actions.
(MC) Done(e,-,mc(x,y,s))→A(Comm(e,x,y,s)Z+Done(-,-,cc(e,x,y,s))).
Axiom MC (Make Commitment) states that:
• if an agent (not necessarily x or y) performs an action of making a commit-
ment with x as the debtor, y as the creditor, and s as the content,
• then on all paths x is committed, relative to y, to the truth of s,
• until an agent possibly cancels such a commitment, after which the com-
mitment no longer exists.
Axiom MC only deﬁnes the meaning of making a commitment, without spec-
ifying in what way and under what conditions an agent can actually create or
cancel a commitment, which is dealt with in Section 4.
(MP) Done(e,-,mp(x,y,s))→
A(Prec(e,x,y,s)Z+(Done(-,-,ap(e,x,y,s))∨Done(-,-,cp(e,x,y,s)))).
Axiom MP (Make Precommitment) is analogous to MC.
(AP) Done(e′,-,ap(e,x,y,s))→A(Comm(e′,x,y,s)Z+Done(-,-,cc(e′,x,y,s))).
Axiom AP (Accept Precommitment) implies that if an agent performs an
action of accepting a precommitment brought about by event e with x, y, and
s respectively as debtor, creditor, and content, then the acceptance action
brings about on all paths a commitment of x, relative to y, to the truth of
s, which will stand until it is possibly cancelled. Again, the axiom does not
show the conditions under which an agent can accept a precommitment in an
actual case.
There are no speciﬁc axioms for the actions of cancelling a precommitment
(cp) or a commitment (cc), because the analytical eﬀects of these commitment
manipulations are already illustrated in the axioms dealing with other actions,
whose performance must be presupposed in order to take into account any kind
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of cancellation. This issue is dealt with in more detail in the next section.
3.3 Ontological presuppositions
It is important to remark that some of the commitment manipulation ac-
tions rely on ontological presuppositions, that is, they can be performed only
if particular states of aﬀairs hold. In fact, only if a precommitment actually
exists, it can be refused by the potential debtor, or cancelled by the potential
creditor. Moreover, it can be accepted by the potential debtor only if it is
not contemporarily cancelled by the potential creditor. Similarly, the onto-
logical presupposition to a commitment’s cancellation is the existence of the
commitment itself. Formula
Poss(τ)
states that an event of type τ is ontologically possible. The deﬁnition of these
ontological presuppositions is also part of the core ontology. We assume that
making a commitment or a precommitment is always ontologically possible,
as speciﬁed by the following axioms:
(PMC) Poss(mc(x,y,s)),
(PMP) Poss(mp(x,y,s)).
The axioms dealing with the presuppositions to the actions of cancelling and
accepting are the following:
(PCC) Poss(cc(e,x,y,s))↔X−Comm(e,x,y,s);
(PCP) Poss(cp(e,x,y,s))↔X−Prec(e,x,y,s);
(PAP) Poss(ap(e,x,y,s))↔X−Prec(e,x,y,s)∧¬Done(-,-,cp(e,x,y,s)).
The core ontology also describes the states (fulfilled, violated, pending) in
which a commitment can be. The deﬁnition of these states relies on the truth
conditions of the content of the commitment, which are formally described in
the next section.
3.4 Sentence meaning and truth conditions
Before we deﬁne the truth conditions of CL sentences, two remarks should be
made. First, the truth of a temporal sentence at a given state (the point of
reference, [7]) can be evaluated only if we know at which state the sentence has
been uttered (the point of speech). For example, the sentence “I shall pay you
within the end of the month” implicitly refers to the end of the current month,
which in turn is determined by the state at which the sentence is uttered.
Second, branching time brings in a phenomenon known as contingent future,
which means that at a given point of reference it may be still undetermined if
a sentence is going to be true or false. Consider again to the previous example,
and assume that the sentence has been uttered, on January 10th, and that no
payment has been made as far as January 15th; on January 15th, the sentence
is still not settled true nor settled false, and thus it is undeﬁned. Note however
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that a sentence that is true (false) at a state, will go on being true (false) at
all states in the future of that state. We represent CL sentences as SL terms,
which allows us to deﬁne CL semantics in SL. More precisely, we ﬁrst assume
that for every SL term s that denotes a CL sentence, there is exactly one SL
formula s	 that corresponds to s, which we call the sentence meaning of s;
then we deﬁne the truth conditions of s in SL.
CL semantics is dealt with by means of the following predicates, whose
deﬁnitions we call truth conditions of a sentence:
True(e,s)↔ AF−(Done(e,-,-)∧s	),
False(e,s)↔ AF−(Done(e,-,-)∧¬s	),
Undef (e,s)↔ AF−Done(e,-,-)∧¬True(e,s)∧¬False(e,s).
Note that the A path quantiﬁer in front of the F− operator is necessary, even
if our model structure is not branching in the past, because formula s	 may
include operators like F+ that need a path to be speciﬁed. The truth conditions
of sentence s are given with respect to an event e, which does not necessarily
correspond to the event of uttering s. Event e is used to set a well-deﬁned
temporal reference by which we can evaluate the truth of s. We may then
analyze the logic of CL-sentences, but the topic lies beyond the scope of this
paper. The truth conditions of a CL sentence determine the fulﬁllment or the
violation of the relevant commitment. More precisely, a commitment whose
content is s is said to be fulfilled, violated, or pending respectively when s is
true, false, or undeﬁned according to the above deﬁnitions. The event with
respect to which the truth conditions of the content are checked is the one
that has brought about the commitment. Here are the axioms that formalize
what stated above:
Fulf (e,x,y,s)↔Comm(e,x,y,s)∧True(e,s),
Viol(e,x,y,s)↔Comm(e,x,y,s)∧False(e,s),
Pend(e,x,y,s)↔Comm(e,x,y,s)∧Undef (e,s).
Intuitively, every commitment is either fulﬁlled, or violated, or pending. It is
actually possible to prove that
|=Comm(e,x,y,s)→xor(Fulf (e,x,y,s),Viol(e,x,y,s),Pend(e,x,y,s)).
This means that only one of Fulf (e,x,y,s), Viol(e,x,y,s), or Pend(e,x,y,s) is
true in all models in every state in which Comm(e,x,y,s) holds.
The core ontology deﬁnes the collection of entities that may exist in the
context of an institution, and also the set of possible changes such entities may
undergo; as a consequence, the core ontology delimits the set of all possible
institutional actions. However, not every ontologically possible action can be
actually carried out: it is part of the function of an institution to authorize
the execution of a subset of the ontologically possible action.
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4 Authorizations of the Basic Institution
Consider again the example of ordering: if we want to follow the example of
human societies, in which issuing orders is not eﬀective unless some special in-
stitutional framework (e.g.: a military hierarchy) is deﬁned, we can deﬁne the
Basic Institution so that it does not authorize agents to create commitments
as creditors. We then need to introduce a predicate to state that an agent is
authorized to bring about an event of a certain type. In general, to perform
an action of type τ , agent x must be authorized to do so, that is, the formula
Auth(x,τ)
must hold. A reasonable set of authorizations concerning the creation and
the manipulation of commitments can be deﬁned in the form of an axiom as
follows:
(ABI) Role(x,BI,RegAgt)∧Role(y,BI,RegAgt)→
Auth(x,mc(x,y,s))∧ Auth(x,mp(y,x,s))∧ Auth(x,cp(e,x,y,s))∧
Auth(x,cp(e,y,x,s))∧ Auth(x,cc(e,y,x,s))∧ Auth(x,ap(e,x,y,s)).
This formula means that: as a debtor a registered agent is authorized to make a
commitment with any registered agent as the creditor, and accept or cancel an
existing precommitment; as a creditor a registered agent has the authorization
to make precommitments with any registered agent as the debtor, and cancel
an existing commitment or precommitment.
All the communicative acts that comply with the authorizations deﬁned
above are institutional actions, whose execution is authorized by the Basic
Institution. On the contrary, as ordering corresponds to performing a make
commitment action as a creditor, it is not authorized by the Basic Institution,
and thus some further institution is required for an act of such type to be
carried out.
5 Norms of the Basic Institution
Authorizations deﬁne the institutional powers of agents; in general, however,
the exercise of such powers is further regulated by a set of norms. Consider,
for example, a scientiﬁc society: the president of the society typically has the
power to call the general meeting of the society’s members; the president,
however, is also obliged to call such a meeting at least once a year, and may
be allowed to call it more often if he or she has good reasons to do so. At
the present stage of our research, we still do not know what kind of norms
should be regarded as part of the Basic Institution. Consider for example
the adjacency pair made up by a request and its acceptance or refusal. At
some institutional level, we might want to dictate that agents should react to
all requests by producing an acceptance or a refusal. But is this rule to be
regarded as a norm of the Basic Institution? Or does it belong to a special
institution, like for example an “Institution of Dialogue”? We feel that more
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work has to be done in order to clarify this issue; in particular, practical
applications will have to be analyzed to get a better understanding of the
systems of norms involved in the functioning of real multiagent systems.
6 Conventions of the Basic Institution
An institutional action is performed through the execution of some lower level
act that conventionally counts as a performance of the institutional action;
obvious examples are oﬀered by communicative acts, which are performed by
executing lower level acts of message exchange. As a consequence, institutional
actions require a set of conventions for their execution. In our approach, the
institutional actions of the Basic Institution are commitment-manipulations
actions, conventionally realized by the exchange of ACL messages, as described
in the following axioms. In other words, these axioms deﬁne a library of basic
communicative acts in terms of commitment manipulation.
In Section 4 we have illustrated the six authorizations that registered
agents are granted by the Basic Institution. Now we have to deal with the
structure of the messages that agents exchange in order to perform those au-
thorized commitment manipulation actions. We view a message as a pair
made up by a type indicator and a body. Type indicators (corresponding to
KQML’s performatives [5]) are constant symbols taken from a ﬁnite set whose
deﬁnition is part of SL. The body can be a CL sentence represented in our
semantic language by a ﬁrst-order term. In the case of acceptance or refusal
messages, the body is comprised of a more complex structure, that is, a tuple
of elements (〈e,x,y,s〉) that identiﬁes an existing (pre)commitment. For every
message type we need to introduce a functor that speciﬁes the relevant type
of the action that an agent performs when exchanging a message of such kind.
This approach is best explained in terms of an example. Suppose that agent
x sends a message to agent y to inform y that σ is the case. The exchange
of such a message is an event of type inform(x,y,s), where inform is a three-
place functor denoting the type of the message, x and y denote the sender
and the receiver of the message respectively, and s is a term corresponding to
SL formula σ. When event e is an exchange of a message of type inform and
content s, sent by agent x to agent y, the formula
Done(e,x,inform(x,y,s))
holds. This event, under given conditions, implies the performance of a com-
mitment manipulation action. In other words, the meaning of the message is
deﬁned as the eﬀect that exchanging such a message has on the network of
commitments binding the sender and the receiver. The correspondence be-
tween the message exchange event type and the commitment manipulation
action type is deﬁned by a convention of the relevant institution, and is for-
mally stated by means of the formula
CountAs(τ ,τ ′),
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which means that an action of type τ conventionally counts as an action of type
τ ′. Here we deﬁne the communicative acts by means of which agents carry out
the commitment manipulation actions authorized by the Basic Institution.
Informing is deﬁned as committing to the truth of the message body,
which, we suppose, is comprised of an arbitrary CL sentence. More precisely,
when agent x exchanges with agent y an inform message with content s, agent
x commits, relative to y, to the truth of s:
(CAInf) CountAs(inform(x,y,s),mc(x,y,s)).
We assume that the body of a request message is comprised of an action
expression, which indicates the requested action’s type, its actor, and possibly
a temporal constraint. More precisely, in the request message we use a term
that represents the abstract syntax of an action expression, which is not to
be confused with its concrete form, which belongs to a speciﬁc CL. In our SL,
an action expression may have the form Done(x,τ)B+Γ, in which B+ means
intuitively “before” (φB+ψ  ¬(¬φ U+ ψ)), and Γ is an SL formula referring
to a particular time-point. Here we are assuming that for every time-point
expression of a CL (e.g. “Wednesday”, “Christmas”, etc. if we consider a
CL using English terms referring to time) there exists an SL formula which
becomes periodically true according to the time-point it is indicating (the
period is one week for “Wednesday”, one year for “Christmas”, and so on).
Thus, in this case the body of a request message is comprised of the term
Done(x,τ)B+Γ, in which  is a function which, given an SL formula φ,
returns the relevant SL term φ. If we denote the term above with s, and
then deﬁne the type request(x,y,s) to denote events by which agent x requests
s from agent y, the semantics of request messages is conventionally deﬁned as
below:
(CAReq) CountAs(request(x,y,s),mp(y,x,s)).
The above-mentioned action expression is only an example that works in par-
ticular cases. Several more action expressions can be deﬁned to meet diﬀerent
needs, using more complex temporal operators, but we think that such a task
is to be tackled only when we deal with the application of our framework to
actual cases.
The act of accepting is not only deﬁned with respect to requests, but
with respect to precommitments in general. We assume that the body of an
acceptance message is a tuple which includes all the elements that uniquely
identify the relevant precommitment. To denote the event types corresponding
to such message exchange we introduce the functor accept(e,x,y,s), whose
arguments are the same as those characterizing the precommitment that the
sender of the message is accepting, and the relevant convention is as follows:
(CAAcc) CountAs(accept(e,x,y,s),ap(e,x,y,s)).
The Basic Institution allows registered agents to cancel the commitments
in which they play the role of the creditor and the precommitments in which
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they are the debtor or the creditor. The body of a cancel message is supposed
to be the same as that of an accept message, that is, a tuple which includes all
the elements that uniquely identify the relevant (pre)commitment. To denote
the event types corresponding to such message exchange we introduce the
functor cancel(e,x,y,s), whose arguments are the same as those characterizing
the (pre)commitment which is cancelled by the relevant message exchange.
The conventions are then deﬁned like this:
(CACancP) CountAs(cancel(e,x,y,s),cp(e,x,y,s)),
(CACancC) CountAs(cancel(e,x,y,s),cc(e,x,y,s)).
A cancel message exchange can count as diﬀerent commitment manipulation
actions (cp and cc), in accordance to what is being cancelled (a precommit-
ment or a commitment, respectively). There is no ambiguity in an actual
cancel message exchange, as there cannot exist both a precommitment and
a commitment with the same arguments, and only an action that cancels
an existing object can be successfully carried out, as stated by Axioms PCC
and PCP in Section 3.3. These ontological presuppositions contribute to the
general deﬁnition of institutional actions, as illustrated in the next section.
7 The general representation of communicative acts
We are now ready to give a general deﬁnition of communicative acts. The con-
ventions of the Basic Institution establish that exchanging a message of given
type counts as a speciﬁc institutional action, provided certain conditions hold.
These conditions can be classiﬁed in two categories: ontological presupposi-
tions, deﬁned by the core ontology, and authorizations. While authorizations
deal with the institutionalized power of agents, ontological possibility concerns
the state of aﬀairs that must hold for a communicative act to be possible. All
these points are formally expressed by the following axiom that gives a general
deﬁnition of institutional actions:
(IA) Done(e,x,τ)∧CountAs(τ ,τ ′)∧Poss(τ ′)∧Auth(x,τ ′)→Done(e,x,τ ′).
As an example, let us consider the act of informing. Suppose that the formula
Done(e1,a,inform(a,b,s1))
holds, that is, agent a informs b that s1 is the case. From Axiom CAInf we
derive CountAs(inform(a,b,s1),mc(a,b,s1)), and thus we determine the com-
mitment manipulation action that corresponds to such a message exchange.
We suppose that formulae
Role(a,BI,RegAgt) and
Role(b,BI,RegAgt)
hold, that is, both a and b are registered agents in the Basic Institution.
Given these premises and Axiom ABI, which illustrates what actions registered
agents are authorized to perform, we have (among other consequences)
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Auth(a,mc(a,b,s1)).
Axiom PMC states that it is always ontologically possible to perform a make
commitment action, thus, from the premises above and Axiom IA we can
derive
Done(e1,a,mc(a,b,s1)),
which, thanks to Axiom MC, gives
Comm(e1,a,b,s1).
8 Special institutions, declarations, and performatives
This section deal with communicative acts, like orders and declarations, which
cannot be performed thanks to the Basic Institution only.
8.1 Special institutions
Ordering is a kind of communicative act that falls out of the context deﬁned
by the Basic Institution. We can consider orders like requests that cannot be
refused. Following our approach, a request brings about a precommitment,
while an order directly creates a commitment in which the addressee of the
message is the debtor. Given these premises, analogously to the deﬁnition
of requests, we may take also the body of an order message to be an action
expression, and postulate that:
(CAOrd) CountAs(order(x,y,s),mc(y,x,s)).
However, the Basic Institution does not authorize agents to directly create
commitments of which they are the creditor. This means that even if agent a
exchanges a message with agent b containing an order to s2, that is, even if
Done(e2,a,order(a,b,s2))
holds, there exists no axiom that we can use to derive
Done(e2,a,mc(b,a,s2)).
To introduce orders in our communication framework, however, we can
deﬁne a special institution that grants agents that play particular roles in it the
authorization to give other agents commands. Let us call such an institution
SI, and suppose that it introduces the following authorization axiom:
(ASI) Role(x,SI,high)∧Role(y,SI,low)→Auth(x,mc(y,x,s)).
Axiom ASI states that agents that play the high role in SI are authorized
to issue orders to agents that play the low role within the same institution.
Now, if we assume that agent a and agent b play roles high and low in SI
respectively, we can derive
Done(e2,a,mc(b,a,s2)), and then, thanks to Axiom MC,
Comm(e2,b,a,s2).
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8.2 Declarations
As is well known, a declaration is a speech act that, under appropriate condi-
tions, makes its content true. The content of a declaration must represent an
institutional fact of some sort, and the agent that makes the declaration has
to be authorized to bring about such an institutional fact; besides, it must be
ontologically possible to bring about the fact. As an example, consider the
act of opening a society’s meeting; such an act can be performed by the pres-
ident of the society by making a suitable declaration. Indeed, the fact that a
meeting is open is institutional; the president of the society is authorized to
open the meeting; and ﬁnally, to successfully open a meeting by declaration,
it must not be the case that the meeting is already open. All this presupposes
a special Institution of Associations, which in particular will include a deﬁ-
nition of meetings in its core ontology, and authorize the president to open
a meeting. Additional norms to regulate the exercise of institutional powers
can also be deﬁned. With respect to conventions, in our opinion, declarations
can be regarded as a universal convention for the performance of all sorts
of institutional actions. The logical deﬁnition of declarations is particularly
interesting, because it states that
(CADecl) CountAs(declare(τ),τ).
This deﬁnition implies that declaring an action of type τ counts as the actual
performance of an action of type τ , provided such a performance is ontolog-
ically possible and the actor is authorized to perform actions of type τ , as
stated below:
Done(e,x,declare(τ))∧Auth(x,τ)∧Poss(τ)→Done(e,x,τ).
8.3 The performative execution of communicative acts
It is a remarkable fact that, once declarations are deﬁned, it becomes possible
to realize all communicative acts as declarations. Suppose for example that
agent x exchanges with agent y a speciﬁc message of type declare whose body,
expressed as a suitable content language sentence, means “I commit to the
truth of ‘2 + 2 = 4’ ”. The formula
Done(e,x,declare(mc(x,y,‘2 + 2 = 4’)))
represents such a message exchange. We derive
Done(e,x,mc(x,y,‘2 + 2 = 4’))
from our premises and a number of axioms, and then, by Axiom MC, we have
that
Comm(e,x,y,‘2 + 2 = 4’)
holds.
We conclude that the exchange of the declaration message described above
has the same eﬀect as the exchange of a message of type inform, as analyzed
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in Section 7. This means that messages of type inform are not strictly nec-
essary, because the same result can be obtained by a declaration, performed
in the context of the Basic Institution. Given that the same line of reasoning
can be applied to all types of messages, it turns out that all communicative
acts can be realized through the use of a single type of messages, namely
declaration messages. Carrying out a communicative act by declaration cor-
responds to the well-known performative execution of the communicative act
[8]. In our communication framework, all communicative acts that boil down
to commitment-manipulation action can be carried out in performative form,
thanks to the authorizations granted by the Basic Institution. This fact has
an important practical side: it is possible to deﬁne a full ACL starting from
one single type of messages, that is, declaration messages; all other types of
messages can then be regarded as useful abbreviations of declaration messages,
but do not increase the expressive power of the ACL.
9 Conclusions
In this work we have presented a framework for agent communication that
is being developed to deal with the current ACL proposals’s shortcomings.
In our approach, we have assumed that agent communication is carried out
by means of the performance of communicative acts; such acts are performed
by exchanging conventional messages, and have institutional eﬀects deﬁned
in the context of given institutions. We take the social structure of a multi-
agent system to rely on commitments, whose creation and manipulation are
regulated by the Basic Institution. All agents, in that they are registered as
such at this institution, interact according to its rules, that is, their message
exchanges aﬀect the network of commitments that bind agents to each other.
The Basic Institution not only deﬁnes the set of entities the social structure
comprises, but also speciﬁes the institutional eﬀects agents are authorized to
bring about, the conventions that agents must follow and the preconditions
that must hold so that such eﬀects can be achieved, and possibly the permis-
sions and the obligations agents are imposed. The Basic Institution enables
agents to carry out several types of communicative acts, such as informing
or requesting, but it is not enough for dealing with orders and declarations,
whose felicitous performance needs further special institutions that provide
for suitable hierarchical organizations and additional authorizations. In par-
ticular, we have shown that all kinds of communicative act can be carried out
in the form of a declaration, that is, they can be executed in a performative
way. Our future work will mainly deal with special institutions, to tackle
role compatibility issues that may rise from the possibility of having an agent
registered in one or more institutions other than the basic one.
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